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The Classical notion of competition revisited 
Neri Salvadori and Rodolfo Signorino1 
 
1. Introduction 
The gravitation of market prices towards natural prices in all markets characterized by free 
competition was widely affirmed by the Classical authors, despite the lack of formal proof. In the 
wake of the revival of interest in Classical economics fostered by the publication of Production of 
Commodities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa 1960), since the mid 1970s a vast literature has 
blossomed concerning the stability of long-period equilibrium within multisectoral models of 
Classical inspiration. (For a survey of this literature see Bellino 2010.) Besides the formal results 
achieved on the subject of stability, the debate on gravitation has stimulated an in-depth 
investigation of the Classical notion of market competition (Arena 1979, Semmler 1984, Steedman 
1984, Duménil and Lévy 1987). This investigation has also highlighted some unsatisfactory aspects 
in the latter, particularly as regards the actual process of market price determination in a situation of 
short-period equilibrium: 
[L]ittle is said concerning the actual process [which governs the functioning of the market for commodities]. For 
example, it is not clear who is changing prices, what information is used, when this change occurs, what the outcome is 
on the market etc. (Duménil and Lévy 1987, p. 136) 
[L’originalità della teoria classica della libera concorrenza] non è però in grado di nascondere certe insufficienze: 
l’economia politica classica si scontra infatti con il problema centrale dell’articolazione tra prezzi di mercato e prezzi 
naturali. La soluzione di queste difficoltà richiede una nuova definizione di questa articolazione. (Arena 1978, p. 323)2 
                                                             
1 University of Pisa and University of Palermo, respectively. Corresponding author: Neri Salvadori, Dipartimento di 
Scienze Economiche, Università di Pisa, via Cosimo Ridolfi 10, 56124, Pisa – Italy; e-mail: nerisal@ec.unipi.it The 
paper was prepared for the Italian National Research Project, cofinanced by the Italian Minister of University, 
“Heterogeneous Sectors, Growth, and Technical Change” (2007). A previous version of this paper was presented at the 
13th Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Thessaloniki, Greece, 23 – 26 
April 2009 and at VII Annual Conference of the Italian Association for the History of Political Economy, Trento, Italy, 
30 May – 1 June 2010. We wish to thank without implicating Alain Alcouffe, Enrico Bellino, Stefano Fiori, Heinz D. 
Kurz, Manuela Mosca, Arrigo Opocher and Maria Pia Paganelli for their comments. Usual caveats apply. 
2 [The originality of the Classical theory of free competition] is not however able to hide certain inadequacies: the 
Classical political economy clashes with the central problem of the articulation between market prices and natural 
prices. The solution of such difficulties requires a new definition of this articulation (our translation) 
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The aim of this paper is to overcome some of the above drawbacks of the Classical view of market 
competition by showing how some of the analytical tools and formal results achieved by the 
modern game-theoretic approach to oligopoly theory may be used to give formal precision to the 
Classical notion of market prices. In particular, recent commentators of Classical economics have 
emphasized that in a situation of short-period equilibrium, when the quantity of a given commodity 
brought to the market differs from Smithian effectual demand, the likely outcome is that of a 
dispersion of prices: 
Whereas natural price is by definition a singular magnitude for each kind of commodity, the competitive processes 
whereby market prices deviate from natural price under conditions of market imbalance are consistent with, indeed 
likely to cause, transactions at non-uniform prices. That is to say, market price as literally the actual prices at which 
transactions occur when there is such market imbalance, is not in general a singular magnitude (Aspromourgos 2009, p. 
72. See also  idem, pp. 85 and 88) 
Accordingly, we claim that the notion of mixed (that is, non-deterministic) price-strategy may be 
fruitfully employed to analyze the behavior of the agents acting in situations of market imbalance.  
In what follows, we distinguish and compare two different conceptions of market competition: the 
Walrasian notion of perfect competition and the Classical notion of free competition, focusing in 
particular on Adam Smith and Karl Marx. We stress that while the Walrasian notion may be 
described as an equilibrium state in which atomistic agents treat prices parametrically, the Classical 
notion is a situation in which agents employ their market power by setting prices strategically. The 
absence of a price-taking assumption in the Classical authors is the main reason why the theoretical 
difficulties besetting the Walrasian notion outside market-clearing equilibrium do not plague the 
Classical notion as well. Yet, though for the Classical authors price undercutting or outbidding are 
the typical phenomena which occur in any market characterized by free competition, it is fair to say 
that they went no further than providing only some unsystematic guidelines on how to analyze in 
due detail the competitive process of market price determination. Therefore, we propose a rational 
reconstruction of the Marxian view of market competition to substantiate our claim that Marx’s 
extensive use of metaphors and numerical examples hides the modern taxonomy of buyers’ market, 
sellers’ market and mixed strategy equilibrium in the capacity space of a standard Bertrand duopoly 
model. By means of a simple symbolism we sketch the elements required to identify a necessary 
and sufficient condition to separate these three different market outcomes. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 compares two different notions of the concept of 
market competition, the Classical notion of free competition and the Neoclassical notion of perfect 
competition, and highlights some problematic aspects of the latter, absent in the former. Sections 3 
and 4 are devoted to an assessment of the Classical theory of free competition, as developed by 
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Adam Smith and Karl Marx, with particular concern to the issue of market price determination. 
Section 5 investigates how the Classical notion of competition has percolated into the modern 
literature on so-called Bertrand competition. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Two different notions of market competition or just one? 
Few commentators would disagree with the following statement: 
Although the concept of competition has always been central to economic thinking […] it is one that has taken on a 
number of interpretations and meanings, many of them vague. (Vickers 1995, p. 3) 
In particular, Vickers distinguishes the notion of perfect competition – a “seemingly tranquil 
equilibrium state in which well-informed agents treat prices parametrically” − from the “original 
and ‘real’ concept” of competition − a “rivalrous behaviour with respect to prices and other 
variables in a world characterized by flux, uncertainty and disequilibrium.” (idem, p. 7) 
Despite the differences between these two notions, many authors have come (more or less 
explicitly) to consider the Classical notion of free competition but a primitive and pre-analytical 
version of the Neoclassical theory of perfect competition, a version still imbued with casual 
empiricism: 
It is a remarkable fact that the concept of competition did not begin to receive explicit and systematic attention in the 
main stream of economics until 1871. This concept … was long treated with the kindly casualness with which one treats 
of the intuitively obvious. […] ‘Competition’ entered economics from common discourse, and for long it connoted only 
the independent rivalry of two or more persons. (Stigler 1957, p. 1) 
Such an interpretation has deeply influenced many of the leading exponents of Neoclassical 
economics. (See for example Arrow and Hahn 1971, in particular Chapter 1 ‘Historical 
Introduction’, and Samuelson 1978.) Even outside the Neoclassical camp this interpretation has 
found supporters, such as Kaldor when he claims that “one can trace a more or less continuous 
development of price theory from the subsequent chapters of Smith [the fourth Chapter of The 
Wealth of Nations] through Ricardo, Walras, Marshall, right up to Debreu and the most 
sophisticated of present-day Americans” (Kaldor 1972, p. 1241). Vickers himself concludes that 
“the claim that there are two concepts of competition is somewhat misleading” (Vickers 1995, p. 7). 
Nonetheless, historians of economics who have endorsed an alternative point of view have not been 
lacking. McNulty (1967) not only argued that the Classical notion of competition as a behavioral 
process is radically different from the Neoclassical notion of competition as an equilibrium state, 
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but he went so far as to claim that the Neoclassical assumption of individual price-taking behavior 
is entirely alien to the Classical analysis:3 
Smith’s concept of competition was decidedly not one in which the firm was passive with respect to price but was, 
rather, one in which the market moved toward equilibrium through the active price responses of its various participants. 
(McNulty 1967, p. 397) 
Therefore, what in the previous interpretation appears simply as a process of analytical refinement, 
in McNulty’s view is no less than “a basic conceptual change” (ibidem). Moreover, McNulty adds 
that, pace Stigler, the Classical notion of competition is far from being derived from casual 
empiricism. Smith is the great systematizer of the analysis of the concept of market competition 
carried out by a series of authors before him (most notably, Boisguillebert, Cantillon and Turgot) 
and his specific contribution was to raise the concept of competition to a “general organizing 
principle of economic society […] After Smith’s great achievement, the concept of competition 
became quite literally the sine qua non of economic reasoning” (McNulty 1967, pp. 396– 397. See 
also McNulty 1968, pp. 646 ff). 
McNulty’s interpretation raises the matter of investigating the theoretical conditions which have led 
to such a dramatic change of meaning in the original notion of competition. A first step in this 
direction may be found in the distinction between two different notions of economic science − i) 
economics as the science that studies a system of forces and ii) economics as the science that 
studies a system of relations – a distinction which was introduced by Dardi (1983) and was recently 
emphasized by Giocoli (2005):  
According to the system-of-forces (SOF) view, economics is a discipline whose main subject is the analysis of the 
economic processes generated by market and not-market forces, including - but by no means exclusively - the processes 
leading the system to an equilibrium. According to the system-of-relations (SOR) view economics is a discipline whose 
main subject is the investigation of the existence and properties of economic equilibria in terms of the validation and 
mutual consistency of given formal conditions, but that has little if anything to say about the meaningfulness of these 
equilibria for the analysis of real economic systems. (Giocoli 2005, p. 180)  
According to Giocoli (ibidem), the SOF view was the dominant vision up to the years between the 
two world wars, while the SOR view gained popularity only in the second postwar period when 
                                                             
3 From this point of view, McNulty’s interpretation is akin to those of Hollander (1973) and Eatwell (1987). The former 
claims that “the Smithian conception of competition must be carefully distinguished from the modern conception which 
envisages sellers (and consumers) as “price-takers” rather than “price-makers”.” (p. 126); while the latter points out that 
“the characteristics of ‘perfect’ competition (notably the conditions which ensure price-taking) are often read back, 
illegitimately, into Classical discussions of competition.” (p. 63). See also High 2001, pp. xiv ff and Machovec 2005, 
Chapter 8. 
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considerable intellectual effort was devoted to the project of a full axiomatization of economic 
science. Similarly, in a series of papers Blaug (1997, 2002 and 2003) indicated in the formalist 
revolution of the 1950s and the parallel rise to dominance of the Walrasian general equilibrium 
theory the two driving forces which led to the decline of the classical (and early Neoclassical) 
notion of competition as a process and its replacement with the modern notion of competition as an 
end-state (with the associated first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics). 
Thus it may be claimed that the semantic shift in the notion of competition is part and parcel of a 
more general process of redefinition of central categories and concepts of economic analysis started 
in the 1930s with the rediscovery of Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Donzelli 1990, chapter 
9) and fully accomplished in the late 1970s with the rediscovery of the Nash equilibrium concept 
(Giocoli 2003, chapter 5): the Classical notion of market competition makes little sense outside the 
SOF view, while the Walrasian notion of competition perfectly fits the theoretical standards set by 
the SOR view.  
There are at least two reasons why the distinction between the Classical notion of competition and 
the Neoclassical one and careful analysis of the theoretical domain of the latter is not simply a 
historiographical exercise: 
(a) the Neoclassical theory of perfect competition carries with it some theoretical difficulties alien 
to the Classical notion of free competition; 
(b) the Classical notion of competition can be made analytically precise in terms of the modern 
concept of mixed strategies equilibrium. 
The final part of this Section is devoted to substantiating point (a) above, while we defer analysis of 
point (b) to Section 5. 
As pointed out by Green (1974), every market equilibrium concept requires the specification of a 
consistent set of behavioral postulates that prescribe what happens in equilibrium and what happens 
outside equilibrium. In the Walrasian framework, the behavioral postulates that define the situation 
of equilibrium differ from those that define the adjustment mechanism in disequilibrium. As regards 
the former, the behavioral postulate is that every agent assumes market prices as parametrically 
given and, on the basis of such prices and other constraints, maximizes his/her own objective 
function. By contrast, in disequilibrium, the behavioral postulate is that a meta-agent, the 
auctioneer, determines market prices according to market excess demands. Moreover, no 
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transactions among the agents are allowed to take place during the adjustment process.4 As a 
consequence, the price-taking behavior assumption implies that each individual firm in a given 
market has no incentive to set a price different from the ruling market price and has no incentive to 
carry on transactions at a price other than the Walrasian market-clearing price. Thus, such an 
assumption drastically reduces the theoretical domain of the theory to equilibrium, market-clearing 
situations.5 
To our knowledge, Arrow (1959) was the first to highlight the logical difficulties besetting the 
Neoclassical theory of perfect competition: 
the Law [of Supply and Demand, Arrow’s equation 3: dp/dt = h(S – D) with h' < 0 and h(0) = 0] is not on the same 
logical level as the hypotheses underlying equation 1 [D = f(p) and S = g(p)]. It is not explained whose decision it is to 
change prices in accordance with equation 3. Each individual participant in the economy is supposed to take prices as 
given and determine his choices as to purchases and sales accordingly; there is no one left over whose job it is to make a 
decision on price. (Arrow 1959, p. 43)6 
In short, for Arrow in the perfect competition set-up there is no place left for “a rational decision 
with respect to prices” (idem, p. 41) thus implying the conclusion that “perfect competition can 
really prevail only at equilibrium” (ibidem). The solution proposed by Arrow (1959) to study 
market price dynamics outside market-clearing equilibrium consists in turning to the theory of the 
monopoly: 
                                                             
4 From this perspective Edgeworth’s concept of equilibrium (core) and his adjustment process in disequilibrium 
(recontracting) are superior to the Walrasian ones: “The recontracting process … is based on the same behavioral 
postulate, blocking by coalitions, that is used to define the solution concept, the core [The core is defined to be the set of 
all unblocked allocations. That is, it is the set of all allocations such that no subset of the participants can improve the 
position of all its members by withdrawing from the system and using only resources of its members]. This seems to be 
a desirable property. It is, however, not shared by most studies of disequilibrium price dynamics because these involve 
price changes brought about by a market manager or other artificiality. Prices do not vary as a consequence of the 
maximizing behavior of individuals.” (Green 1974, p. 22) 
5 Also current textbooks acknowledge this fact: “Strictly speaking, it is equilibrium market prices that [consumers and 
producers] will regard as unaffected by their actions. […] For the price-taking assumption to be appropriate, what we 
want is that [consumers and producers] have no incentive to alter prices that, if taken as given, equate demand and 
supply (we have already seen that [consumers and producers] do have an incentive to alter prices that do not equate 
demand and supply) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 314, fn 1 and p. 315, authors’ emphasis) 
6 D (S) is the quantity demanded (supplied) of a given commodity X, p its price, f(p) and g(p) the demand and supply 
functions, respectively, while dp/dt = h(S – D) is the time derivative which formalizes the law of motion of market price 
in relation to market excess demand. 
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when supply and demand do not balance, even in an objectively competitive market, the individual firms are in the 
position of monopolists as far as the imperfect elasticity of demand for their products is concerned. (idem, p. 46) 
However, Arrow claims that standard monopoly theory must be modified so as to remove the 
assumption that the monopolist knows perfectly her own demand curve (besides her own cost 
curves): 
Uncertainty [as to the demand curve] is a crucial consideration in the theory of monopolistic price adjustment. (idem, p. 
44) 
In such circumstances, the monopolist will vary her own price, in a process of trial and error, until 
she finds the price that maximizes her expected profits. 
For our purpose, the salient points of Arrow’s analysis are the following: 
1) Jevons’ Law of Indifference, which states that there is only one price ruling in a competitive 
market, ceases to be valid in disequilibrium:  
Although the broad tendency will be for prices to rise when demand exceed supply, there can easily be a considerable 
dispersion of prices among different sellers of the same commodity (idem, pp. 46 – 47). 
2) By assuming that competition takes place on both sides of the market, that is, competition among 
sellers and competition among buyers, a buyers’ market may be distinguished from a sellers’ 
market: 
By a parallel argument each buyer on a market with an inequality between supply and demand can be regarded as a 
monopsonist […] In disequilibrium, the market consists of a number of monopolists facing a number of monopsonists. 
The most general picture is that of a shifting set of bilateral monopolies […] In general, it is reasonable to suppose that 
if the selling side of the market is much more concentrated than the buying side, the main force in changing prices will 
be the monopolistic behavior of the sellers […] Similarly, if the buying side of the market is the more concentrated, as 
in non-unionized labor markets, the dynamics will come from that side (idem, p. 47, emphasis added).  
In the following two Sections we will make it clear that these two elements of Arrow’s contribution 
may be found in Smith’s and, even more explicitly, in Marx’s treatment of market prices, thus 
paving the way for a restatement of the Classical notion of competition by means of contemporary 
game-theoretic analysis. 
 
3. The Classical notion of free competition: Adam Smith 
Richardson (1975, pp. 350 – 351) has convincingly argued that “competition features within The 
Wealth of Nations in two different contexts; first, in the account given of the balancing of supply 
and demand in particular markets, and, secondly, in the explanation of structural and technological 
development. Smith offers us in effect both a theory of economic equilibrium and a theory of 
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economic evolution; and in each of these competition has a key role to play.” In what follows we 
concentrate on the static aspect of the Smithian notion of market competition, concerned with 
market price determination, leaving aside its dynamic aspect (see Lavezzi 2003). 
As far as the Classical notion of market competition is concerned, the locus classicus is Book I, 
Chapter VII of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.7 Smith’s working assumption is that it is possible to 
classify the economic forces in action in a given moment into two broad categories, i) those erratic 
and short-lived forces that determine the market values both of commodity prices and the 
distributive variables and ii) those systematic and persistent that determine the natural values of the 
same magnitudes. Classical economists generally hold the view that only the latter can be the proper 
subject of scientific inquiry (Ciccone 1999, p. 70).8 
The data from which the Smithian argument starts are the natural rates of wages, profits and rents 
which, sectoral specificities apart, depend mainly on the conditions of prosperity of the economic 
system under scrutiny, its “advancing, stationary, or declining condition” (WN I.vii.1). The natural 
price of (re)production of the various commodities derives / springs from the summation of these 
three elements. The natural price is therefore a magnitude that is not immediately formed in the 
market, but that, given some appropriate conditions, may come true in the market. Indeed, the 
natural price constitutes a sort of a floor for the market price in the sense that the latter cannot 
remain for long below the former without seriously jeopardizing the reproduction of the commodity 
in question: 
The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of [the natural price]; but does not oblige them to 
accept of less. […] The natural price, or the price of free competition … is the lowest which can be taken, not upon 
every occasion, indeed, but for any considerable time together … is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford 
to take, and at the same time continue their business. (WN I.vii.11) 
The theoretical importance of natural prices consists in providing a guide to the theorist with the 
purpose of explaining the dynamic path followed by market prices: 
                                                             
7 As is well known, Ricardo devotes to the distinction between natural and market magnitudes just the short Chapter IV 
of his Principles where he explicitly refers to Chapter VII of The Wealth of Nations where “all that concerns this 
question is most ably treated” (Ricardo 1951, p. 91). 
8 Ricardo clearly states that the focus of his analysis are only natural magnitudes: “Having fully acknowledged the 
temporary effects which, in particular employments of capital, may be produced on the prices of commodities, as well 
on the wages of labour, and the profits of stock, by accidental causes, without influencing the general prices of 
commodities, wages or profits, since these effects are equally operative in all stages of society, we will leave them 
entirely out of consideration, whilst we are treating of the laws which regulate natural prices, natural wages and natural 
profits, effects totally independent of these accidental causes” (Ricardo 1951, pp. 91 – 92). 
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The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price to which the prices of all commodities are continually 
gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them 
down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of 
repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it. (WN I.vii.15) 
To study the genesis of market prices and the existing relations between market prices and natural 
prices Smith introduces the concept of effectual demand that is “the demand of those who are 
willing to pay the natural price of the commodity”. It is to be stressed that the relationship between 
the quantity brought to the market and the effectual demand determines only the market price of a 
commodity and not also its natural price.9 Moreover, “demand” and “supply” are treated by Smith 
as given quantities and not as functional relationships between price and quantity characterized by 
well-defined formal properties, as they would be in the Neoclassical theory (Garegnani 1983, 
Aspromourgos 2009, pp. 83 ff).10 
Given the unplanned nature of market economies, at the end of a productive cycle, entrepreneurs 
may not face in the market a demand able to absorb the whole of their production at the natural 
price (at least). This requires the specification of an adjustment mechanism powerful enough to 
bring about effective convergence to a situation in which the produced quantity coincides with the 
effectual demand: in the absence of such a mechanism, natural prices may not constitute a reliable 
guide to explain the movements of market prices.11 
In short, the adjustment mechanism envisaged by Classical authors is as follows. At the end of a 
productive cycle, the entrepreneur brings to the market a given quantity of produced commodity 
resulting from the production decisions taken at the beginning of the cycle just concluded. Of 
course, this quantity cannot be modified to adjust to the demand actually encountered on the 
market. Thus, the adjustment variable is constituted by the selling price of the commodity. Smith 
                                                             
9 See Ricardo’s rejection of the opinion that price depends solely on the proportion between these two quantities 
(Ricardo 1951 vol. I, p. 382). 
10 Differences between the classical and the neoclassical theories of value and distribution have been emphasised by 
authors such as Bharadwaj (1978), Roncaglia (1978) and Garegnani (1984). Needless to add, historiographical 
controversies are still very much alive: see Blaug (1999 and 2009) vs Kurz and Salvadori (2002 and 2010). 
11 This consideration may explain Ricardo’s emphasis on the effectiveness of the adjustment mechanism: “When we 
look to the markets of a large town, and observe how regularly they are supplied both with home and foreign 
commodities, in the quantity in which they are required, under all circumstances of varying demand … without often 
producing either the effect of a glut from too abundant a supply, or an enormously high price from the supply being 
unequal to the demand, we must confess that the principle which apportions capital to each trade in the precise amount 
that is required, is more active than is generally supposed” (Ricardo 1951 vol. I, p. 90, emphasis added) 
10 
assumes that, in the presence of a gap between production and effectual demand, a sort of auction 
starts among the agents that happen to be on (what we today would call the) long side of the market: 
such agents are prepared to offer higher and higher prices (in case of excess demand) or lower and 
lower prices (in case of excess supply). 
Once the market price of any commodity happens to be different from its natural price, this causes 
an imbalance in the distributive sphere in the sense that the remunerations of those people that have 
contributed to the production of the commodity prove different from their respective natural values. 
In the absence of entry/exit barriers and in the presence of market transparency the difference 
between the market price and the natural price brings about (i) an intersectoral reallocation of 
economic resources in search of the highest market remuneration and (ii) a variation in the 
produced quantity of the commodity in the following periods. This process comes to a halt only 
when the produced quantity and demanded quantity balance in correspondence of the natural price 
and the market values of wages, profits and rent equal their respective natural values.12 Therefore, 
the imbalance in the sphere of circulation (discrepancy between natural price and market price of a 
commodity) spills over to the sphere of distribution (discrepancy between natural values and market 
values of wages, profits and rent) and, finally, to the sphere of production (intersectoral reallocation 
of productive resources and variation in quantities produced in the following periods).  
The assumed tendency of market values towards their respective natural values is based on two 
assumptions: 1) the owners of the employed inputs consider, besides the outlay costs, also the 
opportunity costs in their decisions as to where to allocate their economic resources (Aspromourgos 
2009, pp. 67 and 98) and 2) there are but negligible barriers to the intersectoral mobility of 
economic resources (idem, p. 91): 
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages 
of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to their 
natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price. The commodity is then sold precisely 
for what it is worth, or for what it really costs the person who brings it to market; for though in common language what 
is called the prime costs of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the person who is to sell it again, yet if he 
sell it at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the 
trade; since by employing his stock in some other way he might have made that profit. […] Though the price, therefore, 
which leaves him this profit is not always the lowest at which to dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at 
which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change 
his trade as often as he pleases. (WN I.vii.6, emphasis added) 
                                                             
12 However, Classical economists were perfectly aware of the existence of profit and wage rate differentials. For a 
modern treatment see Kurz and Salvadori 1995, Chapter 11.  
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The above shows that Smith devotes much care to determining natural values and to the gravitation 
process of market magnitudes to their natural counterparts. The same cannot be maintained as 
regards the question of market price determination, particularly when the market is not in a situation 
of long-period equilibrium. Taking stock of Smith’s sparse hints on this subject it is possible to 
point out what follows. 
1) In those markets in which competition is not free (e.g., because of legal monopoly and/or the 
presence of a guild, a collusive agreement, a law or a rule that somehow prevents economic agents 
allocating their resources in the sector they prefer) or where there are industrial secrets, 
entrepreneurs voluntarily limit the produced quantity so that the market is left understocked and the 
market price stays artificially high: 
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws which restrain, in particular 
employments, the competition to smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in 
a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of 
employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages 
of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate. (WN I.vii.28) 
Conversely, where competition is free and industrial secrets absent, price-undercutting starts as 
soon as at least two competitors are present in the market. This process is amplified by increasing 
the number of competitors since this fact makes the establishment of a collusive agreement more 
unlikely: 
The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold in a particular town is limited by the demand of that 
town and its neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the grocery trade cannot exceed what is 
sufficient to purchase that quantity. If this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will tend 
to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; and if it were divided among twenty, their 
competition would be just so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the price, 
just so much the less. (WN II.v.7) 
2) Smith’s explanation concerning the determination of market prices in situations of short-period 
equilibrium includes both elements that are seemingly the fruit of a casual observation and that he 
does not analyze in greater detail (the wealth of the buyers and their desire to get the commodity vs 
the necessity of the sellers to dispose of their own commodities) and elements that he instead 
systematically applies in his analysis of the various markets. Of the latter, the most significant is the 
relative number of sellers and buyers and their relative ability to make a binding agreement. The 
market price will be high or low depending on whether buyers are more numerous than sellers (and 
vice versa): the buyers “bid against one another” offering higher and higher prices, the sellers “bid 
against one another” offering lower and lower prices. The relative number of the buyers in relation 
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to the sellers is therefore the crucial element: every time that the agents on one side of the market 
are few and are able to communicate (e.g. because they operate in the same place such as a town) 
while the agents on the other side of the market are many and are unable to communicate (e.g. 
because they are isolated and scattered in the countryside) the bargaining from which the market 
price springs will obviously be more favorable to the former. This is particularly evident in Smith’s 
analysis of the labor market: 
What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract usually made between those two parties, 
whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. 
The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour. It is not, however, 
difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the disputes, and 
force the other into to compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more 
easily; and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the 
workmen. […] When in any country the demand for those who live by wages; labourers, journeymen, servants of every 
kind, is continually increasing; when every year furnishes employment for to greater number than had been employed 
the year before, the workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise their wages. The scarcity of hands 
occasions a competition among masters, who bid against one another, in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily 
break through the natural combination of masters not to raise wages. (WN I.viii.11-12 and 17) 
In the following Section we show how Marx draws on and develops these elements of Smith’s 
treatment of market prices. 
 
4. The Classical notion of free competition: Karl Marx 
In Chapter 3 of Wage-Labour and Capital (Marx [1847] 1933) it is possible to find a vivid 
description of the determination of the short-period price in the market of a raw material, cotton. 
We think that such a description provides a clue to the young Marx’s view of the competitive 
process. The Chapter bears the title “By what is the price of a commodity determined?” and Marx’s 
answer is the quite conventional one: “By the competition between buyers and sellers, by the 
relation of the demand to the supply, of the call to the offer.” (idem, p. 21) Yet, immediately after, 
he adds that “[t]he competition by which the price of a commodity is determined is threefold”. 
(ibidem, emphasis added) The first element highlighted by Marx is competition among the sellers:  
Whoever sells commodities of the same quality most cheaply, is sure to drive the other sellers from the field and to 
secure the greatest market for himself. […] [It is competition among the sellers] which forces down the price of the 
commodities offered by them. (ibidem)  
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The second element is competition among the buyers which “causes the price of the proffered 
commodities to rise” (ibidem). These two aspects of competition are not considered sufficient to 
fully determine the outcome of the competitive process. In fact, Marx adds a third and last element:  
Finally, there is competition between the buyers and the sellers: these wish to purchase as cheaply as possible, those to 
sell as dearly as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon the relations 
between the two above-mentioned camps of competitors – i.e., upon whether the competition in the army of sellers is 
stronger. Industry leads two great armies into the field against each other, and each of these again is engaged in a battle 
among its own troops in its own ranks. The army among whose troops there is less fighting, carries off the victory over 
the opposing host. (ibidem, Marx’s emphasis) 
We claim that the metaphor of the two armies which, at the one and the same time, are engaged in 
fighting one another and in their own ranks, coupled with the suggestion that the result of the battle 
is eventually decided by the interplay of these two levels of fighting, paves the way to an interesting 
analytical intuition. In our view, Marx’s rhetoric foreshadows the modern notion of a mixed 
strategy equilibrium: the outcome of market competition needs not be univocally determined, even 
if optimal (mixed) strategies are. 
To clarify his thought Marx goes on to provide a concrete example. Marx’s choice of a raw material 
market for this didactic purpose is illuminating. In the market of a consumption good it is quite 
obvious to assume a multitude of atomistic buyers. In such a case competition among buyers would 
be reduced to their reservation prices and, eventually, described by means of a demand curve. It 
may not be so in the case of a raw material market, where the number of buyers may exceed that of 
sellers and, in some cases, it is even possible to reverse the image of atomistic buyers to that of 
atomistic sellers. Marx’s example starts with the analysis of what, in modern terminology, is called 
a sellers’ market:  
Let us suppose that there are 100 bales of cotton in the market and at the same time purchasers for 1,000 bales of cotton. 
(ibidem) 
The fact that the demand is many (ten!) times greater than the supply is very likely to be intentional: 
if there were 100 bales and purchasers for 110, conditions would have not been, in Marx’s opinion, 
those of a sellers’ market. On the contrary, 100 to 1,000 is considered enough to obtain that  
[t]he cotton sellers, who perceive the troops of the enemy in the most violent contention among themselves, and who 
therefore are fully assured of the sale of their whole 100 bales, will beware of pulling one another’s hair in order to 
force down the price of cotton at the very moment in which their opponents race with one another to screw it up high. 
So, all of a sudden, peace reigns in the army of sellers. They stand opposed to the buyers like one man, fold their arms 
in philosophic contentment and their claims would find no limit did not the offers of even the most importunate of 
buyers have a very definite limit. (idem, p. 22) 
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Obviously, the ratio between 1 to 10 is, in itself, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. This 
is not the place to find a necessary and sufficient condition; yet an attempt to pinpoint the elements 
required for such a condition can be made with the help of a simple symbolism. Let N be the 
number of buyers with the highest reservation price 
 
p
b
 and 
 
B
1
! B
2
! ... ! B
N
 be the different 
quantities of cotton they want to buy. Further, let S be the amount of cotton taken to the market and 
let c be the largest of the reservation prices of the sellers, with 
 
c < p
b
 (the case in which 
 
c ! p
b
 
requires more accurate analysis). 
If 
 
S < B
2
+ ...+ B
N
, that is, if all buyers with the highest reservation price but the largest one among 
them are willing to buy more than the existing amount of cotton, buyer 1 could be excluded from 
the purchase and, as a consequence, any other buyer 2, 3, ... , N could be excluded too. Overbidding 
among these buyers leads the price of cotton to rise to 
 
p
b
. Therefore, the best strategy for each 
buyer is to express a demand for cotton at her reservation price and the best strategy for each seller 
is to quote the price 
 
p
b
.  
On the contrary, if 
 
S > B
2
+ ...+ B
N
, that is, if all buyers with the highest reservation price but the 
largest one among them are willing to buy less than the existing amount of cotton, buyer 1 knows 
that she will certainly buy some cotton. In the limiting case in which all buyers 2, ... , N have 
purchased their desired amount of cotton, buyer 1 is a monopsonist in relation to the sellers who 
have not sold their cotton. Let 
 
p
m
 be this monopsony price. Obviously, the condition 
 
p
m
= c  must 
hold in the absence of other buyers, whereas if there are other buyers, with a lower reservation 
price, buyer 1 must outbid the latter. In any case, the condition 
 
c ! p
m
< p
b
 holds. Clearly, if buyers 
2, 3, ... , N quote price 
 
p
b
 for cotton, buyer 1 will quote price 
 
p
m
< p
b
. But if buyer 1 quotes price 
 
p
m
 for cotton, (some of) the other N – 1 buyers with the highest reservation price will outbid on her 
instead of quoting 
 
p
b
. Therefore, buyer 1 will overbid on them, instead of quoting 
 
p
m
. And so on, 
until the price goes up so much that buyer 1 will prefer again to quote price 
 
p
m
, and so on and so 
forth. In this situation, sellers cannot “stand opposed to the buyers like one man” and “fold their 
arms in philosophic contentment”: they must fight each other to sell at a higher price. As a 
consequence, both armies, to use Marx’s metaphor, are engaged in in-fighting. The best strategies 
for both buyers and sellers are not single (that is, deterministic) prices, but distributions of 
probability within a set of prices. Obviously, determining such distributions of probability requires 
a proper analysis, which cannot be provided here. Let us just remark that if  N = 2 , each buyer has 
just to choose whether or not to overbid her rival, whereas if  N > 2 , each buyer may overbid some 
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of her rivals, but not others.13 Going back to the example, Marx continues by introducing the 
buyers’ market:  
It is well known that the opposite case, with the opposite result, happens more frequently. Great excess of supply over 
demand; desperate competition among the sellers, and a lack of buyers; forced sales of commodities at ridiculously low 
prices. (ibidem)  
Marx’s text reveals that, for him, the buyers’ market and sellers’ market are not contiguous in the 
sense that between them there is something, but apart from the metaphor of the two armies, his 
readers are just left with the obvious remark that  
In the same proportion in which [competition among the sellers] decreases, the competition among the buyers increases. 
Result: a more or less considerable rise in the prices of commodities. (ibidem)  
Following the same argument used above, we can state the following proposition. Be N the number 
of sellers with the largest reservation price and S1 ≥ S2 ≥…≥ SN be the different quantities of cotton 
they want to sell. Further, let B be the amount of cotton buyers are willing to purchase. A buyers’ 
market holds if S2 +…+ SN > B; whereas if S2 +…+ SN < B, then the best strategies for both buyers 
and sellers are not single prices, but distributions of probability within a set of prices. (Once again, 
no attempt will be made for the equality case and for the case in which some sellers have a 
reservation price larger than or equal to the reservation price of some buyers.) This is also enough to 
maintain that between the buyers’ market and the sellers’ market there is room for a mixed strategy 
equilibrium. 
The Marxian text continues by introducing long-period considerations that is, the gravitation of 
market prices towards prices of production (here Marx uses the expression “costs of production”) as 
a consequence of capital migration from (into) those sectors where market prices are below (above) 
costs of production. Yet in Marx’s view, long-period analysis is no way to be privileged over the 
short period and market prices are not to be dismissed lightly as theoretically insignificant. Marx, in 
fact, goes so far as to claim that the typical market outcome is a market price above or below costs 
of production while the equality between the two should rather be considered as an exception: 
The determination of price by the cost of production is not to be understood in the sense of the bourgeois economists. 
The economists say that the average price of commodities equals the cost of production: that is the law. The anarchic 
movement, in which the rise is compensated for by a fall and the fall by a rise, they regard as an accident. We might just 
as well consider the fluctuations as the law, and the determination of the price by cost of production as an accident – as 
is, in fact, done by certain other economists. But it is precisely these fluctuations which, viewed more closely, carry the 
                                                             
13   The case in which 
 
S = B
2
+ ...+ B
N  is more delicate to analyze and no attempt will be made 
here. 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most frightful devastation in their train, and, like an earthquake, cause bourgeois society to shake to its very foundations 
– it is precisely these fluctuations that force the price to conform to the cost of production. In the totality of this 
disorderly movement is to be found its order. In the total course of this industrial anarchy, in this circular movement, 
competition balances, as it were, the one extravagance by the other. (idem, p. 24) 
The reader might think that the elder Marx, equipped with an improved understanding of the 
Classical notion of prices of production and with a more mature version of his own theory of labor-
value, would have not endorsed the foregoing analysis by the young Marx. We think that this is not 
the case, as witnessed by Book III, Chapter X of Capital (Marx [1894] 1909).  
This chapter, bearing the title “Compensation of the Average Rate of Profit by Competition. Market 
Prices and Market Values. Surplus-profit”, is located in Part II, where Marx is confronted with the 
(insurmountable) problem of reconciling the origin of profit from surplus value with a uniform rate 
of profit and a uniform rate of surplus value among sectors. This is not the place to provide a 
thorough assessment of this chapter. It suffices to note the following.  
After identifying in II.X.14 the conditions which need to be met in order that “the prices at which 
commodities are exchanged with one another may correspond approximately to their values”, in 
II.X.15 Marx adds: 
[The fact that] the commodities of the various spheres of production are sold at their value implies, of course, only that 
their value is the center of gravity around which prices fluctuate, and around which their rise and fall tends to an 
equilibrium.  
This sentence has been often quoted in modern literature on the gravitation. However, it is not clear 
whether Marx thinks that the price is unique at each moment of time or, rather, there is a 
constellation of prices at each moment of time. The difference is substantial. If sellers and buyers 
follow mixed strategies instead of pure strategies, there is clearly a constellation of prices at each 
moment of time. Marx also identifies two simple cases. In the first “demand is so strong that it does 
not let up when the price is regulated by the value of commodities produced under the most 
unfavorable conditions” (II.X.16); in this case these conditions determine the market value. In the 
second “the mass of the produced commodities exceeds the quantity which is ordinarily disposed of 
at average market-values” and, as a consequence, “the commodities produced under the most 
favorable conditions regulate the market value” (ibidem). Marx is more interested in the result of 
this process than in the analysis of less simple cases.14 However, in II.X.51, he claims: 
                                                             
14 “No matter what may be the way in which prices are regulated, the result always is the following: 1) The law of value 
dominates the movements of prices, ... . 2) The average profit which determines the prices of production must always be 
approximately equal to that quantity of surplus-value, which falls to the share of a certain individual capital in its 
capacity as an aliquot part of the total social capital” (II.X.17-18).  
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That side of competition, which is momentarily the weaker, is also that in which the individual acts independently of the 
mass of his competitors and often works against them, whereby the dependence of one upon the other is impressed upon 
them, while the stronger side always acts more or less unitedly against its antagonist. If the demand for this particular 
kind of commodities is larger than the supply, then one buyer outbids another, within certain limits, and thereby raises 
the price of the commodity for all of them above the market-price, while on the other hand the sellers unite in trying to 
sell at a high price. If, vice versa, the supply exceeds the demand, some one begins to dispose of his goods at a cheaper 
rate and the others must follow, while the buyers unite in their efforts to depress the market-price as much as possible 
below the market-value. The common interest is appreciated only so long as each gains more by it than without it. And 
common action ceases, as soon as this or that side becomes the weaker, when each one tries to get out of it by his own 
devices with as little loss as possible. (ibidem, emphasis added) 
Here we find a clear echo of the argument used by the young Marx in Wage-Labour and Capital. It 
is also clear that the price is not unique at each moment of time: on the contrary, there is a 
constellation of prices at each moment of time. This fact supports our claims that the process need 
to be analyzed under the assumption that buyers and sellers follow mixed strategies instead of pure 
strategies. 
 
5. Classical competition and Bertrand competition. 
In the previous sections we outlined the Classical notion of competition with particular concern for 
the issue of market price determination. In this section we try to answer the following question: Has 
the Classical notion of competition percolated into modern theory? A positive answer to such a 
question would allow us to make use of some recent results in order to extend the analysis of market 
competition within Classical economics.  
As is well known, in 1883 the mathematician Joseph Louis François Bertrand wrote a review of 
Walras’s Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale (1883) and Cournot’s Recherches sur les 
principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses (1838).15 Bertrand was highly skeptical of the 
then recent blossoming of mathematical economics. In particular, he poured scorn on Cournot’s 
book: 
[Cournot’s] formulae, written only in letters, bristle with unknown functions; [Cournot] would consider it outside his 
field if he were to be more specific. Practical economists must feel that it would be of little value to study such formulae, 
be they true or false, so they escape from this study by merely closing the book. If Cournot’s theory of wealth […] has 
failed to attract any serious attention over the past century, it is because the ideas are lost under the profusion of algebraic 
signs. (quoted in Magnan de Bornier 1992, p. 647).  
                                                             
15 An English translation of Bertrand’s text, originally in Journal des Savants, vol. 48, pp. 499 − 508, is provided in the 
Appendix of Magnan de Bornier (1992). 
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As concerns Cournot’s duopoly model, Bertrand claimed that, pace Cournot, it admitted “no solution 
under this assumption” (ibidem), that is, under the assumption that each duopolist tries to undercut 
the rival in order to attract buyers to herself and stops doing that only when she has nothing more to 
gain from reducing her prices. (Note that for Bertrand it is Cournot himself who assumed price 
competition between the two sellers.) In short, the gist of Bertrand’s criticism is that Cournot failed 
to acknowledge that the envisaged downward movement of prices was limited only by the marginal 
cost.16 A somewhat similar charge of indeterminacy was raised sixteen years later by a distinguished 
economist, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, in a paper originally published in Italian in 1897 and 
translated with some modifications into English in 1925. Edgeworth went beyond Bertrand in so far 
as he claimed that the duopoly model admits a continuous price cycle in the presence of diminishing 
returns:  
[The case of two identical articles] is treated by Cournot as the first step in the transition from monopoly to perfect 
competition. He concludes that a determinate proposition of equilibrium defined by certain quantities of the articles will 
be reached. Cournot’s conclusion has been shown to be erroneous by Bertrand for the case in which there is no cost of 
production; by Professor Marshall for the case in which the cost follows the law of increasing returns; and by the present 
writer for the case in which the cost follows the law of diminishing returns. In the last case there will be an 
indeterminate tract through which the index of value will oscillate, or rather will vibrate irregularly for an indefinite 
length of time. (Edgeworth 1925, pp. 117 – 118, emphasis added) 
To defend this claim, Edgeworth produced a numerical example in which two firms compete on 
prices, but they have capacity constraints. Edgeworth showed there is no (pure strategy) equilibrium 
in his example and formulated a sort of dynamic solution: firms undercut each other until the price 
becomes so low that it is convenient for a firm to quote a high price and sell only to the residual 
demand instead of undercutting the price quoted by the rival. As Edgeworth wrote:  
[A]t every stage in the fall of price, and before it has reached its limiting value [...], it is competent to each monopolist 
to deliberate whether it will pay him better to lower the price against his rival as already described, or rather to raise it 
to a heigher, perhaps the initial, level for that remainder of customers of which he cannot be deprived by his rival 
(owing to the latter’s limitation of supply). Long before the lowest point has been reached, that alternative will have 
become more advantageous than the course first described. (idem, p. 120) 
With the development of game theory and its application to oligopoly models, the so-called 
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, explicitly based on price undercutting, became a fruitful and 
                                                             
16 In Bertrand’s wording "without limits", but this is only because in Cournot's original example the marginal cost is 
zero. 
This is not the place to discuss whether or not Bertrand’s interpretation of Cournot is well-grounded or if Cournot 
actually used prices instead of quantities as strategic variables: see Magnan de Bornier 1992 and 2001, Dimand and 
Dore 1999, Morrison 1998 and 2001. 
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extensively studied alternative to the price-taking competition embodied in the standard perfect 
competition model (see Baye and Kovenock 2008). Yet the contemporary Bertrand competition 
model is somewhat different from the original formulation and from the Classical notion of 
competition. First, it is a one-shot game with a mixed strategy equilibrium and not a dynamic 
process of price undercutting. This feature magnifies the relevance of two missing elements in 
Smith’s and Marx’s writings. First, the problem of firms quoting the same price: in the case of a tie 
the firms fixing the lowest prices must share total demand in one way or another. This requires the 
introduction of a specific assumption in this regard. Second, the problem of how demand is rationed 
when a firm’s quantity demanded exceeds its capacity. The introduction of a demand rationing 
scheme is another assumption lacking in the Classical authors. 
However, a comparison between modern Bertrand competition and Smith’s notion of competition 
and even more the story told by Marx in Wage-Labour and Capital, magnifies some deficiencies of 
the former. First of all, in the former there is a multitude of atomistic buyers described by means of 
a demand curve confronted with a given number of sellers, each defined by its costs (generally 
marginal costs are constant and uniform) and its capacity. On the contrary, in Marx we find a sort of 
symmetry between sellers and buyers. It is certainly not difficult to extend the Bertrand competition 
model to investigate the case in which there is a multitude of atomistic sellers described by means 
of a supply curve confronted with a given number of buyers, each defined by its reservation price 
(possibly constant and uniform) and its purchasing power. Generalization to a symmetrical case in 
which a number of sellers with their costs and selling capacities are confronted with a number of 
buyers with their reservation prices and buying capacities is certainly less obvious. Second, 
Bertrand competition theorists have analyzed quite extensively the case of duopoly with constant 
marginal cost. Few contributions have investigated the oligopoly (see De Francesco and Salvadori, 
2010, and the literature therein referred to). When there are more than two competing firms, many 
changes are needed. In the case of two firms, any firm can either undercut the other or avoid to do 
so. In the case of three or more firms, any firm can either undercut all other firms or just some of 
the firms and not others or none of them. For example in the case in which there are two (not equal) 
large firms and a smaller firm, the latter can avoid high prices so that the two large firms are not 
interested in undercutting it when they undercut each other at higher prices. The small firm can take 
advantage of this protection from competition with larger firms (at high prices) to obtain a larger 
rate of profit (see De Francesco and Salvadori, 2010, Theorem 1(c)). A further problem is that in 
some special conditions the mixed strategies of some firms –but not all– may be undetermined –but 
all profits are uniquely determined– (see De Francesco and Salvadori, 2010, pp. 16-19). 
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6. Final remarks 
In this paper we attempted to assess the Classical notion of free competition in comparison with the 
Walrasian notion of perfect competition. We showed that the latter is plagued with some logical 
difficulties which drastically reduce its explanatory power to equilibrium situations. Such 
difficulties are absent in the Classical notion of competition which, contrary to the Walrasian one, is 
not based on any kind of price-taking assumption. Yet also the former displays some unsatisfactory 
aspects. In particular, while the Classical authors extensively investigated long-period, natural 
values and gravitation, they were more sketchy on market price determination in short-period 
disequilibrium. To fill this lacuna we analyzed Smith’s and Marx’s views on competition between 
buyers and sellers. We claim that, taking inspiration from the modern theory of Bertrand 
competition, it is possible both to render Smith’s and Marx’s hints formally precise, and to provide 
interesting new questions for modern Bertrand competition theorists. 
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Abstract 
The paper seeks to fill a lacuna within Classical economics concerning the process of market price 
determination in a short-period equilibrium. To this aim, first we distinguish the Classical notion of 
free competition from the Walrasian notion of perfect competition and we argue that the latter is 
beset by some theoretical difficulties alien to the former. Second, we reconstruct in some detail 
Smith and Marx’s views concerning market price determination and show that Marx’s extensive use 
of metaphors and numerical examples foreshadows the modern taxonomy of buyers’ market, 
sellers’ market and mixed strategy equilibrium in the capacity space of a standard Bertrand duopoly 
model. Finally, we highlight similarities and differences between the Classical notion of 
competition and contemporary Bertrand competition models. 
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